Markus Vinzent's Blog

Thursday, 27 October 2011

Christ’s Resurrection in Nicola Spanu, review: Early Christianity and the Making of the New Testament by Markus Vinzent



I have to say that I have really enjoyed reading this book. In particular I have appreciated the author’s effort to locate the making of the New Testament inside the context of the debates held by different school masters and their pupils on the crucial points of the nature of the Christian religion. In my book Plotinus, Ennead II 9 [33] ‘Against the Gnostics’ – a Commentary (forthcoming, 2011/2012) I have made the effort to do the same thing, by showing that Plotinus's philosophy sprung from the debates that followed his lectures. The Enneads themselves are nothing but lecture notes systematized by Porphyry after Plotinus's death.
With regard to the constitution of the canon of the four Gospels, I wonder whether Justin and his pupils might have had a role in such an enterprise. I think of Justin because he was a contemporary of Marcion and, like him, an esteemed teacher who founded his own school in Rome, where Prof. Vinzent supposes that the canon of the four Gospels was established. It is evident that only someone with a strong philosophical and religious education could have started such a difficult enterprise and Justin possessed these requisites.
With regard to Prof. Vinzent’s interpretation of the theme of Christ's Resurrection in early Christian authors, honestly it puzzles me the way in which he and the other scholars he quotes attempt to demonstrate the decreasing importance of the Resurrection of Christ after Paul on the basis of the fact that this concept, though sometimes present in post-Pauline Christian literature, does not possess in it the same centrality as in the authentic Pauline letters. With regard to 1Clement, for example, Prof. Vinzent quotes Aland's position, according to whom 1Clement's conception of Christ as ‘the firstfruit, when God raised Him from the dead’ (1Clem. 24:1) is a ‘depressive’, ‘almost marginal mention of the Resurrection of Christ’. The reason of my perplexity is that, given the non-systematic nature of most of the literature we have (which was the expression of constant dialogue and interaction between opposite views), the fact that a certain theme can be objectively marginal (as in the case of Christ's Resurrection in 1Clement) must not necessarily imply that this theme is de facto marginal and irrelevant for the author of the text considered, who can simply have decided to give priority to other concepts instead of those which we, from our point of view, suppose that he should have treated more deeply.
For example, it strikes me the fact that such a fundamental concept as that of the Son as image of the Father's substance (see Hebrews 1:3) is not further developed by the author of this epistle, although its importance was, I think, fundamental for Christians of the first two centuries, because it concerned the very nature of the Son of God. On the other hand, if we supposed that this idea was irrelevant for Christians of the 1st and 2nd century, it would be very difficult to explain why the author of the epistle gave this theme such a prominence by introducing it right at the beginning of the epistle.
I think that in case my criticism were correct, it would not at all put at risk the general structure of Prof. Vinzent’s thesis, because the centrality that Christ's resurrection undoubtedly has in Marcion could well be the final result of decades of academic confrontation on this theme (which in this case would have been central for Christians even before him). With Marcion the debate on Christ's Resurrection would have simply reached a further (and crucial) stage of its development. 
I have found very interesting Prof. Vinzent’s reconstruction of the debate around the true nature of Christ’s body, which for Tertullian is neither that of a demon nor that of a ghost. I think that some conceptions developed by Porphyry on the condition of the souls of the deceased could be relevant for this topic. In the lost treatise On the Styx (which we possess only in a few fragments preserved by Stobaeus) Porphyry says that the souls of the unburied retain a ‘reflected image’, an εἴδωλον, of their physical body and of the clothes they wore at the moment of death (ὃτι δ΄οἱ ἄταφοι ἔξω τοῦ ποταμοῦ διατρίβουσιν εἴδωλον φέροντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν ἀμφιεσμάτων τοῦ σώματος, δηλοῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα.) (See Porphyry, Περὶ Στυγός in: Stob. II. 1. 32. [II. 14. 9-15 3. Wachsm.], 92-94). All souls possess an εἴδωλον of their physical body but the souls of the unburied and of those who have gravely sinned during their earthly life are punished by retaining the memory of their sinful acts, which they are forced to relive until they are judged worthy of entering the Acheron, where they are granted oblivion of their earthly experience (ibid., 27-47).
In the sentence no. 29 of his Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes Porphyry describes the descent of the soul through the heavenly spheres, from which it receives a pneumatic body. During its life, the soul's actions leave an imprint on this pneumatic body that becomes an εἴδωλον, an ‘image’ of the soul’s physical body, which does not abandon the soul even in Hades. (See Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. E. Lamberz, [Teubner, 1975]) Other works by Porphyry which could be interesting are De Regressu Animae 290F 2-5, p. 238 Smith = Augustine, De civit. dei, X. 9. (the fragments of the De Regressu Animae have been collected by J. Bidez, Vie De Porphyre [Gand, 1913]); Ad Gaurum VI. 1. p. 42 5-11 Kalb; De Abstinentia II. 39. 1.
This doctrine was endorsed by Christian authors as well. Synesius for example writes: ‘This psychic pneuma, which famous men have called pneumatic soul, can become either a god or a multiform daemon or a ghost (εἴδωλον) and in this one the soul suffers punishments’ (Τό γέ τοι πνεῦμα τοῦτο τὸ ψυχικόν, καὶ πνευματικὴν ψυχὴν προσηγόρευσαν οἱ εὐδαίμονες, καὶ θεὸς καὶ δαίμων παντοδαπὸς καὶ εἴδωλον γίνεται, καὶ τὰς ποινὰς ἐν τούτῳ τίνει ψυχή). (See id., De insomniis. 7. 2.)
I have thought it useful to cite these conceptions because it seems to me that they are in tune with the Christian debate around the nature of Christ's resurrected body as demonstrated by the fact that Synesius, a Christian bishop (although later than Marcion), wrote about them. Maybe Tertullian knew about these ideas on the afterlife, later on referred to by Porphyry and Synesius (but they must have certainly been developed before them) and stressed the material nature of Christ's body in order to differentiate it from the pneumatic body or εἴδωλον of the deceased and daemons. On the contrary, Marcion's position seems to be more in line with Porphyry's, who in the same sentence 29 says that on the occasion of their descent on earth the most perfect souls (to which Christ’s soul could be associated) receive a pneumatic body of ethereal nature from the stars, while more imperfect souls receive their pneumatic body from inferior natures such as, in hierarchical order, the sun, the moon and finally the humid vapours.
I am sure that Prof. Vinzent’s book will play a fundamental role in fostering the scholarly and non-scholarly debate about such an important theme as Christ’s Resurrection and the making of the New Testament and constitute the solid ground on which further studies will follow.

Higher Chances of Surviving Ovarian Cancer through the right Diet: 8 Suggestions

0. The pre-diagnose diet, but also the post-diagnose diet has significant impact on survival rates in cancer, and, as focussed here, on ovarian cancer:
Here one of the latest overviews:
Beyond the role of diet in modifying risk for cancer recurrence, several reports have evaluated diet as a risk factor for mortality. In fact, prediagnosis diet may influence mortality even more than it impacts recurrence of cancer. For example, a 46% reduction in overall mortality (P=0.05) and a 44% reduction in cancer recurrence (P=0.08) was shown in relation to higher vegetable intake among subjects diagnosed with oral cancer. Similarly, a 43% reduction in overall mortality was shown in the Life After Cancer Epidemiology (LACE) study of breast cancer survivors in relation to intake of a prudent, vegetable- and whole-grain–rich diet (hazard ratio=0.57, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.36 to 0.90). Whereas the Wheat Bran Fiber trial and Polyp Prevention Trial showed no significant reduction in adenoma recurrence with dietary interventions except among those reporting strict adherence to the high-vegetable and -fruit diet of the polyp prevention trial (20). An analysis of prediagnosis diet among colorectal cancer survivors suggested those with the highest Western diet score had a hazard ratio for disease-free survival of 3.25 (95% CI 2.04 to 5.19) and of 2.85 (95% CI 1.75 to 4.63) for recurrence-free survival. These studies reinforce the need to promote a cancer-preventive diet throughout life to improve post-treatment survival.
(Cynthia A. Thomson, David S. Alberts, Diet and Survival after Ovarian Cancer ..., Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 110, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages 366-368)
1. Lots of Vegetable, especially from the family Cruciferae (eg, mustards) and the genus Brassica (eg, broccoli, brussels sprouts, cabbage, and cauliflower, but not Chinese cabbage), no salted fish
From the results of this cohort study, it was suggested that high intakes of dried or salted fish and Chinese cabbage were potential risk factors of ovarian cancer death. In contrast, however, a high intake of soy bean curd (tofu) might have preventive effects against the risk.
(JACC Study Group, F. Sakauchi, M.M. Khan, M. Mori, T. Kubo, Y. Fujino, S. Suzuki, S. Tokudome and A. Tamakoshi, Dietary habits and risk of ovarian cancer death in a large-scale cohort study (JACC study) in Japan. Nutr Cancer,  57  (2007), pp. 138–145).
Longer survival was associated with total fruits and vegetables (HR 0.61, 95% CI 0.38 to 0.98, P for trend=0.10) and vegetables separately (HR 0.66, 95% CI 0.43 to 1.01, P for trend <0.05). Subgroup analyses showed only yellow and cruciferous vegetables to significantly favor survival. Conversely, a survival disadvantage was shown for meats, not generally recommended (HR 2.28, 95% CI 1.34 to 3.89, P for trend <0.01), and specifically the red and cured/processed meats subgroups. An increased HR was also observed for the milk (all types) subgroup (HR 2.15, 95% CI 1.20 to 3.84, P for trend <0.05).
(Therese A. Dolecek, Bridget J. McCarthy, Charlotte E. Joslin, Caryn E. Peterson, Seijeoung Kim, Sally A. Freels, Faith G. Davis, Prediagnosis Food Patterns Are Associated with Length of Survival from Epithelial Ovarian Cancer, Journal of the American Dietetic Association Volume 110, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages 369-382 - the most recent and best survey on the topic)

2. Vitamin E
Our data suggest that, by suppressing telomerase activity, Vitamin E may be an important protective agent against ovarian cancer cell growth as well as a potentially effective therapeutic adjuvant.
(Y. Bermudez, S. Ahmadi, N.E. Lowell and P.A. Kruk, Vitamin E suppresses telomerase activity in ovarian cancer cells. Cancer Detect Prev,  31  (2007), pp. 119–128)
How to get Vitamin E: Nuts and nut oils, like almonds and hazelnuts, Green leafy vegetables, like lettuce, spinach, turnip, beet, collard, and dandelion greens, Tomato products, Pumpkin, Sweet potato (0.26 mg/100 g so it corresponds to 5.8 kg of potatoes per day of the recommended intake for adults), Rockfish, Mangoes, Asparagus, Broccoli, Papayas, Avocados
3. Each cup of tee per day (green or black) lowers the risk of ovarian carcinom by 18% das (although don't think that drinking 6 and more cups eliminates the risk):
During an average follow-up of 15.1 years, 301 incident cases of invasive epithelial ovarian cancer were ascertained. Tea consumption was inversely associated with the risk of ovarian cancer after controlling for potential confounders (P for trend, .03). Compared with women who never or seldom (less than monthly) consumed tea, the multivariate hazard ratios for those who consumed less than 1 cup per day, 1 cup per day, and 2 or more cups per day were 0.82 (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.62-1.08), 0.76 (95% CI, 0.56-1.04), and 0.54 (95% CI, 0.31-0.91), respectively. Each additional cup of tea per day was associated with an 18% lower risk of ovarian cancer (multivariate hazard ratio, 0.82; 95% CI, 0.68-0.99).
(S.C. Larsson and A. Wolk, Tea consumption and ovarian cancer risk in a population-based cohort. Arch Intern Med,  165  (2005), pp. 2683–2686)
4. Not too many eggs, but avoid saturated fats:
Among 523,217 women, 2,132 incident epithelial ovarian cancer cases were identified. Study-specific relative risks (RR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated by Cox proportional hazards models, and then pooled using a random effects model. Total fat intake was not associated with ovarian cancer risk (pooled multivariate RR = 1.08, 95% CI 0.86–1.34 comparing ≥45 to 30–<35% of calories). No association was observed for monounsaturated, polyunsaturated, trans-unsaturated, animal and vegetable fat, cholesterol and egg intakes with ovarian cancer risk. A weakly positive, but non-linear association, was observed for saturated fat intake (pooled multivariate RR = 1.29, 95% CI: 1.01–1.66 comparing highest versus lowest decile). Results for histologic subtypes were similar. Overall, fat, cholesterol and egg intakes were not associated with ovarian cancer risk. The positive association for saturated fat intake at very high intakes merits further investigation.
(J.M. Genkinger et al., A pooled analysis of 12 cohort studies of dietary fat, cholesterol, and egg intake and ovarian cancer. Cancer Causes Control,  17  (2006), pp. 273–285)
5. Low-fat milk is ok and a reasonable amount of milk products, but avoid full fat milk:
Eighteen case-control and 3 prospective cohort studies were eligible for inclusion in the meta-analysis. The findings of case-control studies were heterogeneous, and, except for whole milk (RRsummary for highest vs. lowest category = 1.27, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.97–1.68), do not provide evidence of positive associations between dairy food and lactose intakes with risk of ovarian cancer. In contrast, the 3 cohort studies are consistent and show significant positive associations between intakes of total dairy foods, low-fat milk, and lactose and risk of ovarian cancer. The RRsummary for a daily increase of 10 g in lactose intake (the approximate amount in 1 glass of milk) was 1.13 (95% CI = 1.05–1.22) for cohort studies. In conclusion, prospective cohort studies, but not case-control studies, support the hypothesis that high intakes of dairy foods and lactose may increase the risk of ovarian cancer.
(S.C. Larsson, N. Orsini and A. Wolk, Milk, milk products, and lactose intake and ovarian cancer risk: A meta-analysis of epidemiological studies. Int J Cancer,  118  (2006), pp. 431–441)
 increased consumption of animal-derived food may have adverse effects on the development of hormone-dependent cancers. Among dietary risk factors, we are most concerned with milk and dairy products, because the milk we drink today is produced from pregnant cows, in which estrogen and progesterone levels are markedly elevated.
(D. Ganmaa and A. Sato, The possible role of female sex hormones in milk from pregnant cows in the development of breast, ovarian and corpus uteri cancers. Med Hypotheses,  65  (2005), pp. 1028–1037)
6. Switch from coffee to tee:
Coffee and caffeine consumption has been associated with ovarian cancer risk in several epidemiological studies. CYP1A2 is a key enzyme in the metabolism of coffee and in the activation of heterocyclic aromatic compounds that may be carcinogenic. Data from a preliminary investigation conducted in Hawaii of 164 epithelial ovarian cancer cases and 194 controls were used to examine the hypothesis that coffee and caffeine intake increases the risk of ovarian cancer and that these relations are modified by the CYP1A2 high-inducibility A/A genotype. A personal interview and blood specimen were collected in the subjects' homes. A significant positive trend (p = 0.02) in the odds ratios (ORs) was found with increasing intake of caffeine but not with tea or soda. Regular coffee drinkers were at significantly increased risk (OR = 1.8, 95% confidence interval, CI = 1.1-2.8) of ovarian cancer compared with women who did not drink regular coffee. Women with any CYP1A2 C allele were at similar risk of ovarian cancer (OR = 1.1, 95% CI = 0.7-1.7) compared with women with the A/A genotype. The associations of caffeine and coffee intake with risk were stronger among women with the A/A genotype than among women with any C allele. Somewhat stronger relations of coffee and caffeine intake to risk were found among women with cruciferous vegetable consumption above the median and among cases with mucinous histology. These preliminary data suggest a modest positive association of caffeine and coffee consumption with the OR for ovarian cancer that may be modified by CYP1A2 genotype and exposures, such as cruciferous vegetable consumption, that influence CYP1A2 expression.
(M.T. Goodman, K.H. Tung, K. McDuffie, L.R. Wilkens and T.A. Donlon, Association of caffeine intake and CYP1A2 genotype with ovarian cancer. Nutr Cancer,  46  (2003), pp. 23–29)

7. Moderate consumption of meat, especially read meat, better rare than well-done:
Despite these associations with meat, existing studies suggest that vegetarians do not have reduced risk of breast, bowel or prostate cancer, but there are no quantitative estimates of amounts of meat consumed by meat eaters in these cohort studies. ... individuals with the fast-acetylating genotype who eat high amounts of meat may be at increased risk of large-bowel cancer. ... the type, amount, and cooking method of meat or protein associated with increased risk are not certain. ... interaction between meat, NSP and vegetable intakes on the risk of cancer has not been studied comprehensively. ... Current Department of Health (1998) recommendations are that meat consumption should not rise, and that consumers at the top end of the distribution should consider a reduction in intakes.
(S.A. Bingham, High-meat diets and cancer risk. Proc Nutr Soc,  58  (1999), pp. 243–248.)
502 controls. The dietary assessment included several questions about usual cooking methods for meats and doneness preference for beef. High intake of red meat was associated with increased risks for both stomach and esophageal cancers. Overall, broiling or frying of beef, chicken or pork was not associated with the risk of these tumors. Barbecuing/grilling, reported as the usual cooking method for a small number of study participants, was associated with an elevated risk of stomach and esophageal cancers. after excluding those who reported usually barbecuing/grilling, a source of both PAHc and HCAs, we evaluated doneness level as a surrogate for HCA exposure. Compared to a preference for rare/medium rare beef, odds ratios were 2.4 for medium, 2.4 for medium well and 3.2 for well done, a significant positive trend. Doneness level was not associated with a significant trend in risk of esophageal cancer.
(M.H. Ward, R. Sinha, E.F. Heineman, N. Rothman, R. Markin, D.D. Weisenburger, P. Correa and S.H. Zahm, Risk of adenocarcinoma of the stomach and esophagus with meat cooking method and doneness preference. Int J Cancer,  71  (1997), pp. 14–19.)
8. Moderate consumption of alcohol is fine, but combine with 'dietary folate' (highest in Cereals, Chicken, Beans):
Alcohol has been hypothesized to promote ovarian carcinogenesis by its potential to increase circulating levels of estrogen and other hormones; through its oxidation byproduct, acetaldehyde, which may act as a cocarcinogen; and by depletion of folate and other nutrients. Case-control and cohort studies have reported conflicting results relating alcohol intake to ovarian cancer risk. We conducted a pooled analysis of the primary data from ten prospective cohort studies. The analysis included 529 638 women among whom 2001 incident epithelial ovarian cases were documented. After study-specific relative risks (RR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated by Cox proportional hazards models, and then were pooled using a random effects model; no associations were observed for intakes of total alcohol (pooled multivariate RR = 1.12, 95% CI 0.86-1.44 comparing ≥ 30 to 0 g day-1 of alcohol) or alcohol from wine, beer or spirits and ovarian cancer risk. The association with alcohol consumption was not modified by oral contraceptive use, hormone replacement therapy, parity, menopausal status, folate intake, body mass index, or smoking. Associations for endometrioid, mucinous, and serous ovarian cancer were similar to the overall findings. This pooled analysis does not support an association between moderate alcohol intake and ovarian cancer risk. (British Journal of Cancer Volume 94, Issue 5, 13 March 2006, Pages 757-762)
A high dietary folate intake may play a role in reducing the risk of ovarian cancer, especially among women who consume alcohol.
(S.C. Larsson, E. Giovannucci and A. Wolk, Dietary folate intake and incidence of ovarian cancer: The Swedish Mammography Cohort. J Natl Cancer Inst,  96  (2004), pp. 396–402.)
Our findings from one of the largest data sets of ovarian cancer collected to date, as well as the overall epidemiologic evidence, do not support a role of folate and alcohol in ovarian carcinogenesis
(C. Pelucchi, M. Mereghetti, R. Talamini, E. Negri, M. Montella, V. Ramazzotti, S. Franceschi and C. La Vecchia, Dietary folate, alcohol consumption, and risk of ovarian cancer in an Italian case-control study. Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev,  14  (2005), pp. 2056–2058)

Friday, 14 October 2011

Meister Eckhart, Newly re-discovered Parisian Questions in English Translation

(Here the revised version of all four re-discovered Parisian Questions by Meister Eckhart, work in progress)


Meister Eckhart



New Parisian Questions





Translated, Introduced and Explicated

by

Markus Vinzent
























1. Does the omnipotence which is in God need to be considered as absolute power or as directed power?



And it seems that it has (to be considered) as directed power, because it needs to be considered as that which suits God to do and as that what he is able to do.



The counter‑argument. The omnipotence encompasses all that does not entail the contrary, and this is more than what is directed.



The power in God has to be shown first. Because power is spoken of as being directed towards action. Action, however, is two‑fold:

First, of course, as the form of a passive power, and <second> as activity which accords to an active power.

And this is in God;



On the one hand, because, where there is intrinsic and extrinsic activity, there is power; in God, however, there is intrinsic and extrinsic activity. On the other hand, because according to Avicenna power is first to be found in men since they have the strength to act. God, however, cannot suffer from someone else, hence he is the ultimate action.



But you ask: In which way is this power to be found in God?

The answer has to be: as that what is found in creatures, once the imperfection is removed <from them>, as ultimate perfection.

Again, I say that this power is really one, because it is said of all as one. Further, <divine> essence is principle of all emanations, and itself is one. Therefore, asf.



Second, one has to enquire, in which way that distinction, namely, between absolute and directed power, has to be understood.

If now things are attributed to God himself, such things belong to absolute power.

If, however, things are attributed to himself with regards to intellect and wisdom, they then belong to directed power.

Similarly, thirdly, one has to answer this question that the Master in The Sentences determines, based on the authority of the Saints, and he seems to say that they are both attributed <to God>.

Some, however, say that he is omnipotent from this that he is able to do whatever he wills out of himself and through himself.



The counter‑argument: This only explains the way in which power works. I, therefore, say, <God’s power> rather has to be attributed as absolute power according to <the fact> that it can extend itself to all things, which do not imply contradiction, because it is taken with regards to what is possible.

Likewise, the power of God would otherwise be limited, if it were attributed in a specific way.

Similarly, as knowledge is said of God who knows everything, because he knows everything, so also power. Why, however, does one not say that he wills everything?



I answer: He only wills that to which he applies his knowledge and/or power. And note that he is not called omnipotent because in him be the power for everything, but because he can do everything that is possible.

To this argument it must be said that out of absolute power God can make what is not decent now. If, nevertheless, these things were made, they would be decent and just.

But you may say: He cannot do except what he has foreseen. One has to reply that, if, of course, with regards to 'unless', it refers to action, then this is true, because what he does, he has foreseen. But if it refers to power, then it is wrong.



But you say: Augustine says in the Enchiridion that he is omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills”, not because he can do everything.

One has to reply that Augustine spoke of 'wills', because in ‘everything’ evil is included that God 'cannot' do. Therefore, he speaks like this. 



2. Is the essence of God more real than the property?



It seems that the essence (is more real), because it means infinite reality.



The counter‑argument: Everything acts through realising. A Father, however, generates through fatherhood, because through it <i.e. fatherhood> he is constituted in his being <Father>. Likewise, the Father does not make the Son alike in essence, because in number <according to his essence>, he is the same with the Son.

One has to admit that the question presupposes a real property and an essence as well. Some, however, say that property is the power to generate,

1) first, because power and act are of the same genus, and generating is a relation;

2) next, because acting of a subject, taken per se, is what it is, and the form through which it is, is that through which <it is>;

3) next, because the power to generate is notional, as it does not apply to everything;

4) next, because the Father does not communicate the power to generate when he produces the Son;

5) next, because he does not generate, insofar as he is God, because in this way the Son would have generated, therefore he generates insofar as <He is> Father.



The counter‑argument: Damascenus in his first book, chapter eight <writes>: 'Generating is the work of nature'. Therefore, nature is the principle. Likewise, the noblest act derives from the noblest power. Likewise, the likeness of the product lies in the essence. Therefore etc. It is not valid to say that this is only true in the univocal generation, <but> not in an identical one, because, indeed, it is valid in univocal ones on account of the unity of the form. This, however, is the greater unity, since it is a numerical unity. Likewise, the property cannot be the first term of the formal production, according to the fifth book of the Physics, nor, therefore, the principle; because also whiteness and foundation are always understood as <being> prior to the relation.



To the first of these, one has to say that the passive power and its act are of the same genus, because the <passive> power does not have by itself that it could be set by itself in a genus, but not the active power, which by itself can be set in a genus.



To the second, one has to say, what acts sometimes acts through a common form; because in man the sensitive nature is the principle to remember, which would not be in an animal,

it is appropriated from the Father.



To the third, one has to say, that the power is essential and communal to the Trinity, be it to elicit, if connected with due respect.



<To the forth …>



<To the fifth> that insofar as he is God, with due respect.



Others say, that the essence and the property are the potentiality; more principally, however, they say it is the property. Their reason: Whatever is in the generated, has something else that responds in the generating. In the generated, however, are nature and relation. Therefore etc. More principally, however, it conveys property; because the producer likens the product and sets a distinction, and this he intends most. Therefore, the property is more principally.



The counter‑argument. They do not grasp the sense of the question, because the question is not with regards to the total aggregate, but to that power by which generation occurs. Likewise, the conclusion is false. The determination does not remove what has been signified, but restricts it to the kind of mode in which it is received. The power, however, means the absolute, therefore, to generate does not take away the signified, but only restricts it etc.

Likewise, the power to generate is neither a composite construct, nor one that is intransitive.

About the reason: The principle of generation is that which generates, and thus it is truly argued; but the question relates to the principle that makes the generation to occur.

To the second one has to say that with regards to the end of the generation, rather a distinction is intended, but the intention of the one who acts is primarily to communicate nature.

Others say that the power to generate is formally and intrinsically the essence; that is what I hold. Therefore, Damascenus, in the first book, chapter eight: 'the natural germination is the one according to substance etc.' And the master <Peter Lombard> in the first book, seventh distinction: 'its power is its nature'.

Second, it is shown that a property formally and in itself is not a principle, by which <something happens>. First, because in this way the Father likened the Son to him in fatherhood. Further, because the power is the foundation of relation by which the one who produces is related to the product, and this cannot be grounded in the production, as even in creatures (it cannot be grounded in the production), because it (the relation) is as such in the product, therefore, it is grounded in the power to produce.

Furthermore, because the power to generate is prior to the product, hence prior to the Son and, therefore, it is prior to the Father. Lastly, because the power to generate is a kind of quality, hence, intrinsically it is not a relation.

Thirdly, I say that a certain aspect follows this power, namely that the power to generate is the principle of generation. The principle, however, signifies the order which follows it (the principle). Hence, the aspect follows the power to generate. Accordingly, I understand the master who says that the essence insofar as it is fatherhood is the power to generate. That is true as consequence, not as form or intrinsically.



Furthermore it is argued: in the Son is the essence, therefore also the power. Similarly, that the Father gives everything to the Son; in this, he is not distinct.



On the first one has to say that the potentiality is common, action, however, is not. This is to deduce from the end of the second Analytics <of Aristotle>, because action is singular, the potentiality is universal and common. From which I say, it <the action> does not generate, because the intellect does not remain fruitful in the Son, like the will that remains, for it generates according to its fatherhood.

Or one has to say: that power, insofar as it denotes the aspect, is not in the Son, and, therefore, it cannot become actualized in the Son. And if it is argued that in this way the Son would not be omnipotent, one has to answer that he turns the ‘what’ into a ‘how’.

What relates to the second topic results from what has been said before.

Then, one has to say to the question that there is one act according to the thing, according to the mode of knowing, however, that it is rather to be taken towards the part of the substance. Because the relation is a measure from an entity, as the commentator of Metaphysics XII, note 20 says.

To this argument I partly agree, but the way it is argued is poor. Because the simply infinite is not, unless it is one, and this is the essence, as the Damascene says, because it contains supereminently everything. But infinity, in general, contains supereminently what is common to that genus, so that it is not inconvenient that such is multiplied, because they are of different sorts. From this one can derive our proposition.

Other problems are solved.









Nr. 3 Whether diversity is a real or an intellectual relation?



Though it seems that it is an intellectual one, because it is the opposite of identity.

The counter‑argument. It is between what is really extreme.

To begin with: What does the term 'diversity' mean? Because in the fifth (book of the) Metaphysics (it is said): Diverse is what is diverse from itself through being totally diverse, but when it differs not totally, it is mixed.

Second, how do we understand the term 'relation'?



Some say that is a habit of one’s nature that exists in the ground, and tends towards a real end, but that neither the end nor the ground are included in its nature. Because they say that

<1> certain categories only refer to the thing,

<2> certain (categories) to the thing with respect to its habit, as for example the six (categories),

<3> certain the respect as such, as for example relation.

If, however, the ground were included, it would predicate what (it is = being) which is against Boethius.

Furthermore: The ground is absolute. Hence, it is not something of a relation. And if one argues: ‘related to something else what makes something to what it is asf.’, one conceptualizes the ground.

In the same way is similarity the same quality of many.



With regards to the first one has to say that Aristotle On the Categories defines what is related, not the relation.

With regards to the second, that it is a substantial definition.



But others say that ground and end concur in the constitution of a relation. Namely as matter and form concur in a species, so also here.

Now, I prove it in the following way: A relation can neither be conceptualized nor exist without ground. Therefore it (the ground) belongs to the essence of relation.

But you may say: In this way one could only argue about the accident. One needs to say …

Furthermore, I argue as follows: Relation is an accident based on that something is, but that it is an accident derives from the ground.

Furthermore, there is a difference between a relation according to species and that other according to ground, as is obvious from (the difference between) equality and similarity.

Furthermore, relation as such from another one is not distinguished according to species, hence, the way as it is. But that it is such, it derives from the ground and the end.



On the first of these, one has to say: The thing is said with regards to habit and is different from others as one thing from another, because a thing is differentiated according to the ten categories. Therefore, relation is not some other category. And if one says: one thing accords to several categories as, for example, obviously in the case of knowing, one has to add that a single one in relation to several accords to (several) categories. Because knowing entails two real (aspects), quality and the aspect of reality. Hence, I say: relation is different from these six, because a new relation cannot exist on a new ground, but exists in those six categories, as becomes obvious from the categories of ‘where’ and of ‘habit’. And this is what the commentator notes with regards to Metaphysics V, paragraph 28.



Second, the difference exists, because relation sets the thing in an unspecified way towards something, but those six (categories) specify the habit of a thing to something else.



Third, the difference exists, because relation imports more intrinsically a certain aspect, because relation is by nature of the ground in it, and surfaces from the nature of the ground. The other six, indeed, do not do such.



On the second, one has to say that something is substantially predicated.



On the third, one has to say that it (quality) makes (the species) like matter. Because such species is constituted by both, but its definition is not compound, because that relation does not add to the ground and the relation is according to itself.



Hence, one has to reply to the proposition that diversity taken improperly with regards to similarity etc., then it is a real one. But if it is taken as opposite to identity, it is an intellectual one, the reason being that it is immediately based on substance:

Indeed, because there is no recourse to substance, then because being at presupposes being in, then because the Philosopher in On the Categories grounds all relations on accident, then because otherwise there was no accident. Indeed, relation as a term and concept can be grounded in substance. And in this way, diversity is a non-essential relation.



But against these: Nowhere, the philosopher distinguishes between ‘being said’ and ‘being’. Likewise, I say that such a distinction can easily be found between relatives, but not in relation.



Thus, it is false that a real relation cannot be grounded in substance. Because a relation really sets something else and has a distinct end. And such is God’s relation to the creature.



Further, the white Socrates concurs according to the species with the white Plato, therefore they are similar. Thus, Socrates also concurs with Plato in substance, and in this they are the same of substantial similarity.



Further, if a relation is grounded in matter, it would have a substrate. On this more in due course.



Then, I say that diversity is a real relation because it exists in a thing and is followed by a thing out of the nature of this thing.



Further: three things are required for a relation, namely

<1> that each of the extremes is somehow a thing. Therefore, between something and nothing there is no real relation. Hence, Simplicius: ‘The being of relation is not solitary, it is of one as end, and of the other as ground’. Therefore by both of them reality is given. In addition, the ground is substantial, the end formal. Therefore, the relation between a substance and a form that does not exist, is not a real one.

<2> Second, it is required that each of the extremes is something supposedly different, because it is ordered towards something else, and this other is formal. Therefore the relation of identity is not a real one.

<3> Third, the condition is that it is a consequence out of the nature of the thing and does not follow an intellectual order.

But these three belong to the relation of diversity. Therefore asf.



To the arguments of the opponent that ‘relation is not grounded in substance, because it does not depend’, one has to say that, if one accepts dependence, meaning coexistence, then it belongs to relation, if not, then is like effect to cause, because as such there were no real relation in God.



On the second where it is said: ‘something is in’, like something superior in something inferior, in another way like form in substance. And so concede …



On the other (argument) about the intention of the Philosopher one has to say that the Philosopher said that (the relation) is grounded on three, because first he has introduced the mode of power, or (second) the mode of quantity as mode of numbers – and so, substance, to establish relation, introduces the mode of quantity – or (third) quality.



On the other one has to say that what it derives from its own nature that is an accident.



On the fifth argument one has to say that identity is a substantial sameness with oneself, but different is the identity between two substances.





Nr. 4 Whether the rational difference is prior to the difference in a thing?



As it seems, yes, because the attributes differ according to reason.

The counter-argument: The thing is prior than the ratio.



First on this, what is a real difference? What has been said of a thing. The thing, however, is distinct in the way being is [distinct]. Therefore the thing can appropriately be called an absolute entity.



In another way: What is called a relation is grounded in an absolute thing. In this way [one has also to think] about the difference.



In one way, the intellect is called ratio, in another way conceptualizing is called ratio, but also a thing is called something that is conceived. Because the thing, in order [to be] according to itself, is understood in a primary understanding, an understanding that is grounded in the intellect, for the ascertaining of being.

However, for the ascertaining of signifying, it [the understanding] is grounded in the thing that it signifies. So it is also accordingly with the second intentions.

And so is ratio grounded in the intellect, not in a way that there would be a different ratio in a thing, but solely compared with the act of the ratio. Hence, to differ according to the ratio is to differ according to the act of the ratio. As the act of the ratio is directed towards the conceived thing, in which it is not, it makes this particular thing to be.



Following this, I answer the question that the difference according to the thing is prior. Because one cannot admit a part-difference, as the difference is what a being suffers. Being, however is entirely either outside of a soul, or in a soul. I prove the proposition as follows: As the thing is prior to the ratio, so also the real difference. Likewise the cause is prior to its effect.



Similarly, out of a thing’s nature, the real difference exists before any intellectual act, but the rational difference follows the rational act. Hence, all what follows from this.

Similarly, in …